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Zusammenfassung 
Wurde die Herausbildung europäischer Sozialpolitik von einer spezifischen sozialen Frage 
geleitet oder handelt es sich dabei lediglich um einen Prozess nachholender Integration und 
funktionaler Nebenwirkungen? Dieser Frage geht der vorliegende Beitrag nach und be-
trachtet anknüpfend an Piersons historisch-institutionalistischen Analyserahmen die histo-
rischen Entwicklungslinien der sozialpolitischen Regelungen auf europäischer Ebene über 
einen längeren Untersuchungszeitraum hinweg. Die dadurch hervortretenden, sich langfris-
tig entfaltenden Entwicklungslogiken und Ausweitungsdynamiken geben den Blick auf die 
Besonderheiten europäischer – also supranationaler – Sozialpolitik frei. Nach dem Vorbild 
historisch vergleichender und kontext-sensitiver Studien zur Entstehung des Wohlfahrts-
staats untersucht der Beitrag das Wechselspiel institutioneller und makroökonomischer 
Faktoren sowie die Bedeutung neuer Ideen auf supranationaler Ebene für die Herausbil-
dung von EU-Sozialpolitik. Dadurch wird zum einen die Unverwechselbarkeit europäischer 
Politik deutlich, zum anderen wird gezeigt, wie sich die sozialpolitische Frage der EU lang-
sam von einer den gemeinsamen Markt fördernden hin zu einer den Markt kompensieren-
den Angelegenheit entwickelt. Der Beitrag verdeutlicht, wie aufgrund der sich gegenseitig 
verstärkenden Interaktionseffekte zwischen den einzelnen analytischen Dimensionen von 
Politikwandel die soziale Dimension Europas langsam auch zu einer Frage der Legitimation 
und Integration wird und somit das ursprünglich anvisierte Ausmaß des Integrationspro-
jekts weit übersteigt. 
 
Abstract 
Social science scholars have learnt a great deal from comparative historical and historical 
institutionalist works. In combining different explanatory factors and considering long-
term processes and path-dependencies these studies seem to be much more promising than 
neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist perspectives that frame European social policy as 
spillover effect and negative integration. Therefore drawing on Pierson’s historical-
institutionalist approach this paper applies a long-term perspective to European social pol-
icy, in order to better understand its development and reform. Such a perspective reveals 
the distinctiveness of European social policy and points to an incremental shift in the ration-
ales that have been driving social politics at the European level during the last decades: 
from a market-making issue the European social question evolved into a market-
compensating issue. The paper examines how institutional, macroeconomic and ideational 
factors have been shaping these problem definitions and argues that to the extent that 
those factors interact with and mutually reinforce each other, EU level social policy increas-
ingly becomes involved in questions of legitimacy and social integration and thus by far 
exceeds the initially envisioned level of political integration. 
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Stefanie Börner 
IN SEARCH FOR THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
QUESTION.  
Historicising European Social Policy 
1 Introduction 
The current fiscal and debt crisis makes a common European social policy simultaneously 
more likely and more unlikely. The result depends on the path chosen: It becomes more 
and more unlikely because of a growing tendency to renationalise currencies and the eco-
nomic system. Especially Eurosceptics prefer to recapture nation states’ sovereignty in or-
der to restore their scope of action in the field of social policy (Streeck 1998, 2001). How-
ever, the opposite scenario triggers the Europeanisation of social policy as it reacts to the 
dilemma faced by the EU, i.e. the absence of transnational policies and institutions in an 
atmosphere of increasing economic globalisation and Europeanisation: 
“Common rules and social standards can avert social dumping, unfair competition and 
the uneven economic growth in the Eurozone and the EU. This goal was set in the 
1950s from the founding fathers of the EU and the trade unions. It was restated at the 
Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the Euro, although in a verbal way, but the 
predominance of the neoliberal doctrine left limited space for its implementation. It is 
obvious that we need a new European Social Model, different from the one followed over 
the past decades. We need a real common social space where obligatory rules are 
being implemented and where countries cannot exercise social dumping practices.” 
(Sakellaropoulos 2012, emphasis in original) 
Thus, it still makes sense to debate EU level social policy.  
“Especially in a situation where employment, wages and social transfers are at risk 
national actors call for a European solution in order to safeguard social cohesion: If 
national borders gradually lose their salience and national states gradually become part 
of a global – or at least European – economy, then a natural thought is to organize the 
welfare state at a higher, supranational level, too.” (de Beer 2009: 228)  
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But even 20 years after Maastricht, the question of the future prospects of a Social Europe 
is still “bound to be speculative” (Leibfried 1993: 97) and overshadowed by poor chances. 
Of course, there are no ambitions to build a European welfare state. Therefore, one of the 
key concepts describing and explaining social policy at the European level is the spillover 
effect that stems from the insight that EU politics are shaped by imperatives of the single 
market and mainly the result of negative integration (see Scharpf 1996; Falkner 1998; Leib-
fried 2005; Puetter 2009). But when speaking of European social policy it is important to 
specify whether one speaks of the Europeanisation of domestic social policy regimes 
through coordination and harmonisation measures or of proper supranational welfare 
measures at the European level that potentially make an own welfare regime or at least 
supplement the existing national ones. This paper attempts to grasp the second – suprana-
tional – dimension of EU social politics and therefore proposes a change in perspective.  
In a historical perspective the paper analyses the transformative process which most schol-
ars refer to as the development of a European social dimension and aims at examining the 
extend of supranational European social policies by identifying the key rationales that have 
been guiding the social integration in Europe during the last six decades. Empirically and 
theoretically we have learned a great deal from historical and comparative social policy re-
search. In its narrowest and most unmistakable sense, “modern social policy meant state 
efforts to reduce economic inequality by providing certain floors on income and services 
and preventing income losses due to certain risks.” (Amenta 2003: 97) Thus, social policy 
was at the heart of an enormous growth of states during the twentieth century and was 
crucial for the understanding of the development of Western states (ibid.). However, the 
functional dimension of public social policy has always been much more diverse and com-
plex than simply alleviating hardship or inequality. Different paths to the welfare states 
show that their development can be seen in the light of major transformative processes 
that link to national particularities. Numerous scholars have shown how the political ra-
tionale links pressing social issues to the respective scope conditions and the wider context 
thus producing a wider logic (e.g. Heclo 1974; Orloff/Skocpol 1984; Orloff 1993; 
Huber/Stephens 2001), among which besides economic considerations the integrative di-
mension proofed to be crucial (de Swaan 1988; Baldwin 1990; Manow 2005; Kaufmann 
2003). During the last 120 years national societies served as reference point for these con-
siderations. 
A second way to learn from historically informed work is to appraise the way historical- 
empirical studies approach processes of policy development and their feedback effects that 
influence and reinforce their future character (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000, 2003; 
Huber/Stephens 2001). Social policy development and reform is framed as long-term 
process, within which a set of mutually reinforcing factors impact the policies’ career. 
“Once established, specific patterns of political mobilisation, the institutional “rules of the 
game”, and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often gener-
ate self-reinforcing dynamics.” (Pierson 2003) In applying path dependency and causal pat-
terns unfolding over time to the EU Pierson and colleagues also enriched the debate on 
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European integration. Since the Union and its multiple levels of governance are marked by 
a high level of complexity and issue density, they are especially prone to feedback loops, 
interaction effects and unintended consequences. Therefore, as Pierson argues, considering 
the EU’s intertemporal patterns of policy change is particularly telling (Pierson/Leibfried 
1995; Pierson 1996).  
The following analysis addresses these issues while expanding the theoretical frame of ref-
erence by ideational aspects of policy formation. Therefore, the paper examines the Euro-
pean Union’s social policy making and development in order to answer the question how 
the European social question has been framed. Using the example of three historical peri-
ods of social policy development at the European level the paper examines its historical 
roots, development over time as well as the dynamics of expansion. Hereby I assume that 
the more the EU also began to establish quasi-state structures, the more supranational poli-
cies, which are not only designed to flank the market-building project, were able to de-
velop. Therefore, the first empirical part (3.1) discusses the original notion of EU-level 
social policy as introduced in the Treaty of Rome as well as its reform in the Single Social 
Act in the 1980s. Examining the development of the structural funds until the Treaty of 
Maastricht the second part analyses the growing relevance of the regional and the redis-
tributive dimension for social policy at the European level (3.2) and last but not least the 
paper explains why the 1992 Social Agreement and later the Amsterdam Treaty were able 
to significantly widen the notion of EU social policy in terms of both competences and 
procedures (3.3). But before that, the theoretical and conceptual considerations will be out-
lined (2.1) and embedded into the historically informed framework proposed here (2.2). 
2 New and old social questions 
2.1 EU social policy: Brief state of the art 
This paper does not question the fact that there is a European level social policy but it chal-
lenges the common notion of the social dimension of the EU. This section examines this 
notion and discusses different possibilities to grasp the development and expansion of EU 
social politics. There can be no doubt that social policy at the European level has been ex-
panding ever since the six original members of the European Economic Community signed 
the founding treaty in 1957. Not only that this policy field is steadily gaining ground in the 
treaties of the Community and its predecessors, the 1992 Social Protocol as well as several 
Green and White Papers speak for themselves. However, one can critically reject this view 
by saying that these actions are mainly of a symbolical nature. 
An alternative way to grasp a growth in EU social policy is to consider the qualitative gain 
of power and mandates over the years or the quantitative expansion. Qualitatively, more 
and more competencies in the field of social policy have been granted to the new centre 
such as collective interest representation or funding of employment policies were first men-
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tioned in the Social Protocol or combating of social exclusion to which the Treaty of Nice 
(2000) referred to for the first time. This development was flanked by a slight increase in 
the number of issues that can be decided by qualified majority voting (see Leibfried 2005). 
However, “the policy-making capacities of the Union have not been strengthened nearly as 
much as capabilities at the level of member states have declined.” (Scharpf 1994: 219)  
One can discern also a significant rise in quantitative terms. Not only that the number of 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments on social policy rose from 50 to over 1.000 
between the 1950s and the 1990s, also the financial resources spent on the Union's Cohe-
sion Policy have been steadily rising since the Treaty of Rome established the ESF. While 
in 1973 only 5 per cent of the EU budget was spent on cohesion within Europe, the struc-
tural funds rose and stabilised at over one third of the budget (cp. Ross 1995; Allen 2010). 
More recently, in terms of coverage – an important concept in national welfare state re-
search – scholars have also convincingly argued that the Treaty of Rome expanded the 
right of free movement from workers in coal mining or steel making occupations to all 
workers in 1957; and since the seventies the ECJ systematically widened its scope towards a 
free movement of persons until, finally, in 1993 the Treaty of Maastricht granted every EU 
citizen the freedom of movement and residence throughout the territory of the EU (see 
Recchi/Favell 2009). This expansion is associated with new ambitions of European poli-
tics, so that the steadily growing addressees of European politics can now derive an increas-
ing number of rights from their role as EU citizen, EU worker or EU consumer (Eigmüller 
2012), e.g. the “Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare” enables all medically insured Euro-
pean citizens to consume healthcare abroad and receive reimbursement up to the level of 
home-country rates (Directive 2011/24).  
 
Basically, two classical theory strands have analysed and explained these increasing EU 
social policy activities. The first school conceives the European political system as an inter-
governmental system with a weak centre that is marked by a number of well known institu-
tional and structural constraints, above all Scharpf's joint-decision trap, blocking further 
integrative developments (cp. Scharpf 1988, 1994; Moravcsik 1993). This integration theory 
has been criticised and modified by a group of scholars who include the nation state in a 
wider political structure and therefore argue that the EU forms a multi-level governance 
within which actors at different levels share the decision-making processes (see Marks et al. 
1996; Hooghe/Marks 2001). From this point of view EU social policy is a conglomerate of 
arduously negotiated and weak regulatory and coordinatory measures.  
In the conventional wisdom of the second strand EU-level social policy is mainly the result 
of spillover processes from the single market project. Neofunctionalists expect European 
integration to have an inbuilt expansive mechanism that increases both the policy areas 
involved and the level of supranationality of policy-making (Schmitter 1969; Falkner 1998). 
Applied to social integration European social policies are expected to result from negative 
integration and indirect pressures. 
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Both views will be opposed here. While intergovernmentalism prevents us from recognis-
ing the Commission’s (and other actors’) autonomous actions and independent efforts to 
trigger a social dimension, neofunctionalist explanations fail to take into account the com-
plex institutional and actors’ constellations that shape the policy process and tend to over-
state the potential of the supranational level. In fact, well aware of both its restrictions and 
strengths the Commission creatively confines to the structural conditions and develops its 
own strategies. Therefore, spillover and joint-decision trap are only half of the story as they 
ignore the Commission’s active role (see also Majone 1993; Falkner 1998; Threlfall 2007). I 
assume that the development of social programmes at the European level can be attributed 
to certain contextual factors as well as institutional constraints and dynamics that shape the 
actors’ interests, strategies and scope of action. Here, one can draw on the work of histori-
cal institutionalists who “stress the way institutions shape the goals political actors pursue 
and the way they structure power relations among them” (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 2). This 
comprehensive historical approach to social policy analysis assumes that policy develop-
ments are pre-structured by institutional constraints and mechanisms (cf. Skocpol’s (1992) 
structured policy approach), but is also sensitive to external aspects such as economic 
trends and the like. At the background of these considerations the relationship between 
social policy and economic action can be described not as spillover but as traditionally in-
tertwined as in the eyes of political economists or political sociologists (Hall 2001). 
This has also implications for the conceptualisation of social policy growth. The short 
overview made clear that different accounts grasp different dimensions of EU social policy 
growth. Thus, it is important to specify what one has in mind when speaking of European 
social policy. For example there is a huge difference whether one speaks of the Europeani-
sation of domestic social policy regimes through coordination and harmonisation measures 
or of proper supranational welfare measures at the European level that potentially make an 
own welfare regime. Therefore, the expansion of EU-level social policy will be grasped 
differently here, since the fact that EU actors adopt social regulations on the basis of EU 
treaties does not mean that one can speak of genuine European social policies. The expan-
sive process of social policy formation is grasped here qualitatively as multidimensional 
process of increasing Europeanisation of welfare policies. This means that a distinction is 
been drawn between the consequences of European integration mostly framed as spillover and 
genuine supranational activities, which also take into account the active role of EU level ac-
tors. 
2.2 Old social questions: Bringing EU social politics into perspective 
Historicising means two things here: First, the paper refers to the respective circumstances 
under which EU social policy developed during the last decades and changed its scope and 
scale. Assuming that European level social policy is more than spillover effects, there 
should be a proper social question also at the European level. Second, it tries to learn from 
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historical periods and problems and therefore includes insights from comparative historical 
analysis using it as background knowledge that can be rendered analytically available. 
Trying to learn from national welfare states’ emergence and development does not mean to 
suggest that there is or will be a European welfare state. It is not the result that is of inter-
est here but the process. Simply, the strategic advantage of already completed periods will 
be used: I assume that historical transformations provide insights into the complex and 
multifarious conflicts, interests and constellations and thus can contribute considerably to 
our knowledge and understanding of recent processes (cp. also Sassen 2005).  
But one also has to be aware of the immense structural differences revealed by such a his-
torical-sociological perspective: While most national welfare systems were incorporated in 
fixed state structures and already established nation states, the three of which were strongly 
interrelated, the slowly emerging European patterns of social policy ran parallel to the mak-
ing of the political structures during the last decades. What is more, within nation states 
identity and solidarity interacted with other political, economic and cultural dimensions. 
This “close relationship between identities, interests, and the institutions of social solidarity 
and political decision-making” provides for their historically unique structural stability (Bar-
tolini 2005: 410). At the European level there was no such thing as a nation-building pro-
ject in the beginning. However, over time, one can observe a shift in the patterns of justifi-
cation of EU social policy that came to slightly resemble those in the nation state. There-
fore, the assumption is that to the extent that the European Union also embarks upon state 
and nation-building, supranational social policies that are not only designed to flank market-
building are also able to develop.  
Furthermore, given the fact that the Union faces already occupied sectors in the field of 
social policy it can be assumed that EU level social policy has been creating its own ques-
tions bringing along new types of solutions instead of providing competing solutions to the 
same questions. From the very beginning this rendered the chances for comprehensive 
social provisions at the European level rather bad. 
But national welfare policies neither were anything but natural. On the contrary, specific 
constellations of political, structural, cultural and socio-economic aspects have been and 
still are shaping national paths. Theories trying to explain welfare state development have 
framed the question which aspects proved crucial for a welfare state’s respective definition 
of the social question differently thus highlighting different impact factors (for an introduc-
tion see Myles/Quadagno 2002). There are essentially three different theoretical ap-
proaches trying to explain what determines welfare state development: Modernisation or 
functionalist theory, power resource theories and state-centred approaches. 
While the first theory focuses on industrialisation and other major transformations as the 
main source of welfare state development and the second approach, power resource the-
ory, emphasises “the nexus between a strong and well-organized working class and gener-
ous social policy” (Baldwin 1990: 41), the third perspective centres on political institutions 
and the way state structures influence policies: 
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“This approach views the polity as the primary locus for action, yet understands 
political activities, whether carried on by politicians or by social groups, as conditioned 
by institutional configurations of governments and political party systems.” (Skocpol 
1992: 41) 
In her seminal work Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992) Skocpol contrasts the view that 
there is no U.S. welfare system. Social policies, she argues, have been distinct because influ-
enced by their specific institutional settings actors framed a totally different social question 
that made European scholars conceive U.S. welfare policies as marginal because they are 
not centred around wage labour. This work reveals how dominant concepts may bias social 
scientists’ interpretations of new or different institutions, thus raising awareness of the fact 
that applying established concepts can be useful but it also runs the risk of ignoring crucial 
differences. 
The Bonapartist version of a state-centric theory “regards social policy in a politically func-
tional sense as a means used by social elites of preserving the status quo, sidestepping the 
threat of major reform by granting modest concessions to increasingly important but 
largely disenfranchised classes.” (Baldwin 1990: 39) This logic especially applies to the early 
German welfare state, which therefore exclusively addressed workers (Kaufmann 2003). 
The aim of this working men’s policy was to maintain the workforce and to improve work-
ing conditions (while coping with a limited budget). Because of this logic, the old age pen-
sion scheme was rather focused on workers (and hence on invalidity) and subordinated 
retirees, which is why much more money was spent on invalidity (Kott 1996: 317). Given 
the youth of the German nation and the ongoing mobilisation of the organised working 
class the social reforms of the 1880s proved to be particularly useful as both pacifying pol-
icy and integrative measure. 
In contrast, less affected by the social implications of industrial capitalism, the French so-
cial legislation can be traced back to a number of demographic problems. This structuralist 
or functionalist account explains social policy formation in focusing on a country’s socio-
economic features that are meant to influence social relations. From the end of the eight-
eenth century the country’s birth rate constantly declined while numbers of those older 
than 60 were high compared to Germany; however, the number of industrial workers was 
smaller than in the neighbouring country (ibid.).1 These socio-economic differences led to 
totally different formulations of the social question. As the most famous representative of 
the functionalist perspective also modernisation theory explains the emergence of the social 
question with regard to economic and macro-social trends that require the introduction of 
welfare policies (Wilensky 1965; Flora/Heidenheimer 1981). But since the theory concen-
trated on universal trends such as industrialisation, democratisation or urbanisation it failed 
to explain why different states framed their social question differently.  
                                                 
1 In France the number of births declined between 1815 and 1915 from 33 to 17 per 1.000 population, 
while the rates in Germany only started to drop in 1902 at 35 per 1.000. During the 1880s the industrial 
labour force only accounted for around 26 per cent of the French working population, in Germany it made 
up more than 30 per cent. 
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Thus, depending on the theoretical stance one adopts, a state’s specific distribution of 
power resources, its political institutions and state structures or the structural features ac-
count for diverging guiding principles shaping social policy formation. However, the flaws 
of single perspectives emphasising only one analytical dimension as well as recent theoreti-
cal advancements seem to hint in the direction that combining different explanatory di-
mensions is more fruitful in order to provide a more encompassing picture. Among the 
first Orloff and Skocpol develop a “state-centred frame of reference” that complements 
the traditionally invoked social factors:  
“Overall, we maintain that the politics of social-welfare provision are just as much 
grounded in processes of statebuilding and the organization and reorganization of 
political life as in those socioeconomic processes – industrialization, urbanization, 
demographic change, and the formation of classes – that have traditionally been seen 
as basic to the development of the modern welfare state.” (Orloff/Skocpol 1984: 732)  
State structures, the authors argue, have a long-lasting influence on the preferences of so-
cial groups, a country’s political culture and hence the welfare policies. So in Britain, it is 
shown, the New Poor Law’s national administration laid the foundation for central activi-
ties in the realm of social policy.  
In their work Development and Crisis of the Welfare State Huber and Stephens (2001) also pre-
sent a number of path dependency arguments. Political choices are “made in the context of 
institutional constraints and policy legacies, and of other actors’ resources and strategy.” 
(Huber/Stephens 2001: 190) Thus, for example, the service-heavy, women-friendly Nordic 
welfare states can be explained by linking high female labour force participation, a social 
democratic government, the political mobilisation of women and the expansion of public 
social services. Theoretically, as becomes clear in the example, the study combines state-
centred, power-resource and functionalist arguments in order to be better able to explain 
welfare state development. 
More recently scholars have increasingly come to include ideas, norms and values in their 
analysis and – assuming that they shape welfare policies since they shape the way actors 
perceive the world they live in – combine these factors with institutional analysis in order 
to be better able to explain actors’ choices or institutional change (Béland 2009; Or-
loff/Palier 2009; Béland/Waddan 2012; Sachweh 2011; on EU: Checkel 2001; Parsons 
2002). Ideational analyses highlight different ways how ideas can influence policy change: 
Ideas help to construct the problems that enter political agendas; they may serve as “policy 
paradigms” (Hall 1993) that legitimise or challenge policies or they can command change as 
“powerful ideological weapons” (Béland 2009: 705).  
Overall, in their historically grounded works social scientists tend to be eclectic in how they 
frame welfare state development and change. They interpret the development of national 
welfare policies in the light of major transformative processes as well as particular national 
characteristics among which especially institutional aspects such as state structures or con-
stitutional provisions feature prominently, but also the role of ideas, actors’ constellations 
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and social factors is considered. Secondly, a certain way in dealing with time and processes 
characterises historical, context-sensitive studies. Historical institutionalists stress the role 
of policy and regime legacies and show how those existing structures shape future social 
policies. Thus, since historically grown public policies create major opportunities and con-
straints this scholarship discusses policy change as long-term development that can only be 
understood properly when considering past developments. 
Considering the EU’s specific features one could try to describe its social politics according 
to the above pattern. The question is now: What type of social question is guiding the so-
cial policy of the European Union, i.e. which constraints and opportunities shape its long-
term evolution and how can one properly describe its expansion? In order to answer these 
questions the following sections focus at the macroeconomic structures, institutional con-
straints and opportunities and ideational factors that shaped the development of EU social 
policy. 
3. The European social question or “you cannot fall in love with 
the single market” 
3.1 A question of market making 
From the very beginning the European Union itself derived the need for social policy mea-
sures from the market compatibility requirement. This functional argument can already be 
found in the Treaty of Rome. It aims “to promote improved working conditions and an 
improved standard of living for workers” which are interpreted mainly as a spillover “from 
the function of the common market” (TEEC 1957: Part III, Title III, Art. 117). Accord-
ingly, the social provisions defined in Part III rather represent concessions by the neo-
liberal camp (above all Germany) to those countries more interested in social policy har-
monisation (France and Italy) (Pierson 1996; Falkner 1998). These are few and directly 
linked to the labour market: equal pay for men and women (Art. 119) and common social 
security measures for migrant workers (Art. 121). In regard to labour law, working condi-
tions, vocational training, health and safety at work, the right of association and collective 
bargaining the six signatories promise “close co-operation” (Art. 118) but do not empower 
the Commission to propose laws. In order to render “the employment of workers easier 
and [to increase] their geographical and occupational mobility within the Community” (Art. 
123-128) the founding treaty introduced the European Social Fund (ESF), which was char-
acterised by the free market doctrine as well since it was set up in order to help implement-
ing an integrated labour market. In sum, 
“[t]he dominant philosophy of the Treaty was that welfare would be provided by the 
economic growth stemming from the economics of a liberalised market and not from 
the regulatory and distributive capacity of public policy” (Falkner 1998: 57). 
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Thus, in view of the relevant actors the market compatibility requirement made European 
action necessary. Differences in national labour law, social security etc. were perceived as 
harming the level playing field for economic actors and thus distortion of competition. 
Therefore, the social regulations of that era mark a minimum harmonisation, allowing the 
functioning of the single market. In the following decades, this market building logic and 
the free movement of workers linked to it unleashed a bunch of regulations and ECJ deci-
sions that were supposed to remove national barriers and implement the stipulated free-
doms. Given the fact that the EU-wide economy and competition regime began to intrude 
further into national welfare regimes and yielded unintended effects such as the application 
of the freedom of services to welfare state institutions (cp. Leibfried 2005) scholars framed 
the expansion of the European social dimension as negative integration (Leibfried/Pierson 
1995; Streeck 1995; Scharpf 1996; Leibfried/Obinger 2008). Although this indirect mecha-
nism is one important aspect of EU level social policy, in trying to identify the overall logic 
of the expansion of European social policies this paper follows a different approach. Actu-
ally, the EC’s freedoms were meant to constitute the single market but not to constrain 
welfare state action. So in contrast to national social policy which is often market-
compensating, the Commission and the Council mainly argued with a view to the function-
ing of the Single Market: 
“The EU's social dimension is usually discussed as a corrective or counter to market-
building, but instead appears to have proceeded largely as part of the market-building 
process.” (Leibfried 2005: 257f.) 
Thus instead of being part of a wider state-building project EU social policy rather substan-
tiated the making of the market. The fact that the only group of persons the early Euro-
pean social question directly addressed were migrant workers underpins this logic.  
At the macroeconomic level an increasingly open and competitive world economy and the 
failure of the Keynesian policies during the first oil crisis further consolidated this trend. 
This uncertainty perceived by the political actors resulted in the “consensus of competitive 
liberalism” and the European Monetary System that was meant to improve the domestic 
economies by introducing fixed exchange rates, allowing for a high level of economic 
openness (McNamara 1998). Therefore the constellation of economic insecurity and a new 
liberal consensus between the member states at the beginning of the 1970s gave priority to 
monetarist policies at the political agenda of the EC.  
Thus, it can be explained why in the Single European Act of 1986, which was set to create 
a single market by 1992, member states confined to market-related social policy innova-
tions, namely “health and safety of workers” (SEA 1986: Art. 118a ). So this first major 
revision of the Treaty of Rome did not bring about a conceptual change in social policy. 
Both EC structural politics (ESF and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
introduced in 1975) and the regulations concerning employment, social security and equal 
treatment were geared towards the removal of national barriers in order to enable the func-
tioning of the single market and the mitigation of economic differences that might inhibit 
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competition within the enlarged market. Hence, the EC social question can be framed as 
market question: As it is directly linked to market-making processes, individuals only enjoy 
public support if they work abroad. From a historical perspective, a new mode of social 
policy that protects market building instead of correcting the market has been developing 
in the European Community. In sharp contrast to national social policies that mainly re-
acted to the growing social distress (and its imminent political consequences) produced by 
the market, social policy at the European level is no counter-reaction to an already existing 
common market but is supposed to accompany the market-building process. Thus, only 
the overall aim of the single market provides the supranational character, but in so far as 
EC social policies strove to react to and alter national barriers and deficiencies they repre-
sent no genuine Europeanised social policies.  
However, besides the high politics of the treaties negotiated by member states, one can also 
witness a growing social activism within the EC that can be attributed to the Commission, 
which is slowly gaining power and tries to pursue its own interests and aims. This looming 
tendency of Europeanisation in the realm of social policy will be examined in section 3.3 
but before, the following section will take a closer look at the EU’s structural policies as 
one example of distinct European activities in the realm of social policy.     
3.2 Structural and regional politics  
It became clear so far that beyond the self-declared functional requirement there was not 
much room for social policy in the Community’s early decades. An exception is the Euro-
pean Social Fund (ESF) that can be framed as the first genuine European social policy and 
the only explicitly redistributive component of EC policy, i.e. the only EU-funded social 
policy. The fact that each EU enlargement posed great challenges to the structural funds 
marks them as an “interstate transfer mechanism” under the member states’ control 
(Hooghe/Keating 1994: 371): Following the first Northern enlargement the European Re-
gional Development Fund (ERDF) was introduced in 1975 in order to improve the bar-
gaining position vis-à-vis the UK and the 1994 Cohesion Fund reacted to the growing eco-
nomic divergence between member states. Thus ESF, ERDF and the Cohesion Fund – the 
Union’s major (cross-sectoral) structural and regional instruments – reflect the EU’s domi-
nant economic objectives, but this paragraphs shows that they are also an expression of the 
increasing supranationalisation of EU social policy.  
Together the three instruments make up more than one third of the EU budget today as 
spending on regional policy steadily increased since the 1960s. Especially during the Delors 
presidency (1985–1994) the structural funds of the EU have been significantly revalued. It 
was only then that the EC gained an explicitly redistributive element: 
“The "reform of the Structural Funds" introduced by the Delors package was the first 
substantial European-level attempt to confront regional inequalities by planned 
redistribution among member states. The reform increased Community resources, 
proposed using these funds more effectively, and, most important, sought to 
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consecrate a long-term EC commitment to the kinds of interregional transfers found 
in federal systems.” (Ross 1995: 365) 
In relative terms the budget for structural funds compared to the Union’s overall budget 
almost doubled from 11.4 per cent in 1980 to 21.8 per cent in 1990 (1970: 2.8 per cent, 
2000: 35.7 per cent). The current budget, 2007–2013, is 347 billion (38.33 per cent) (Euro-
pean Commission 2007). 
During the 1970s, when the ESF increasingly addressed structural unemployment targeting 
vulnerable social groups and regions in need, the Commission widened its role as coordina-
tor, conceptualiser and controller of the Fund (Brine 2002) and thereby weakened the ear-
lier notion of regional policy being “little more than an interstate transfer mechanism” un-
der the member states’ control (Hooghe/Keating 1994: 371): While poorer member states 
used to demand financial compensation for their agreement to the single market pro-
gramme in the light the expected gains from market integration, donor states were more 
than willing to pay (Marks 1993; Hooghe/Keating 1994). This changed after the Single 
European Act introduced the concept of cohesion in order to promote an “overall harmo-
nious development”, strengthen the “economic and social cohesion” of the Community 
and in particular to reduce the “disparities between the various regions and the backward-
ness of the least-favoured regions” (SEA 1986: Art. 130a), which was equal to “a long-term 
financial commitment to the poorer areas” (Hooghe/Keating 1994: 374). This enabled the 
Commission to significantly strengthen its role in the 1988 reform process. Thus, although 
member states negotiate the size of the budget the Commission actively shapes and moni-
tors the single programmes and thus also autonomously determines where and on what the 
budget is spent (Marks 1993). In cooperation with regional or local governments as well as 
the member states, the Commission now frames the newly introduced programmes and 
negotiates contracts with the supported regions.  
 
Given their macro-economic focus, structural and regional politics are traditionally framed 
as economic policies within nation states, but the ESF was unequivocally framed as social 
policy: Structurally, it has been housed in the Commission’s Directorate-General for Em-
ployment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (formerly Directorate for Social Affairs) 
and in the Treaty of Rome it appeared under Part III Title III Social Policy. Thus, in order 
to promote economic and social cohesion, the EU seems to identify its own social policy 
fields to tackle internal problems and disparities. Its statements and official documents are 
guided by highly divergent socio-economic parameters and performances. In 2008, GDP 
per capita reached from under 30 per cent of the EU-27 average in the region Severoza-
paden/Bulgaria to 343 per cent in Inner London (Eurostat 2011: 94). At the lower end of 
the spectrum about one out of four inhabitants of the EU lived in regions with a GDP of 
less than 75 per cent of the EU-27 average (mostly the new member states), while on the 
other side of the spectrum, less than 20 per cent of the EU-27 population lived in one of 
the 40 regions, where the GDP was more than 125 per cent of the average (ibid.). But the 
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regional focus cannot only be explained by the fact that there are substantial cross-national 
differences but also by the immensely diverging values within countries. In the 23 countries 
with two or more regions 13 countries host regions with a GDP per inhabitant twice as 
high than the regions with the lowest GDP. The largest within-country inequality can be 
found in the UK and Romania with the richest regions having an almost quintuple value 
than the poorest ones (ibid.).2  
Thus, the overall objective to improve the economic performance within the EU – framed 
as “economic and social cohesion” – drives the structural and regional policies. Here, again, 
EU social policy is guided by a market logic. In contrast to national redistributive policies 
social participation is no objective in its own right. Nevertheless, structural policies reacted 
to the economic and social climate and were not only responsive to member states’ misgiv-
ings and expectations linked to future economic developments. For instance already during 
the 1980s changing labour market conditions and growing unemployment led to a “discur-
sive shift” in the ESF addressing specific groups such as long-term or young unemployed 
(Brine 2002: 61). Therefore it was especially the ESF that successively came to be one of 
the EU’s key instruments regarding employment politics and it is the only employment 
policy that is provided with funds. The structural funds were increasingly designed to com-
bat adverse effects of European integration and serve as financial transfer between regions. 
This incremental shift in the problem definition from improving the overall economic per-
formance in respect to an integrated labour market to cushioning social effects of eco-
nomic integration and securing EU political cohesion is an expression of the greater supra-
national orientation of structural and regional politics in particular and EU social policy in 
general.   
In contrast to its member states, the European Union does not address need at the individ-
ual level but at the macro, i.e. regional level, treating it as structural phenomenon. Given 
the dominant discourse of economic growth and competition, there was a great awareness 
of regional disparities and the economic problems faced by disadvantaged regions or mem-
ber states that might even be exacerbated through market integration. Because the Com-
mission envisions regions as key actors, sub-national governments enter the field as new 
actors3, who become increasingly involved in EU politics (Hooghe/Keating 1994). This 
                                                 
2 However, in terms of outcomes, although the regional disparities constituted a major impetus for the 
structural policies and although Eurostat (2011: 00) observes a general trend towards a “clear progress in 
economic convergence”, this EU-wide trend, in turn, cannot be attributed so easily to the measures ap-
plied by the Union.  
3 This new relevance of the subnational level is also enshrined in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which 
creates the Committee of Regions, a consultative body that was established in 1994 in order to give re-
gional and local governments a voice in issues where regional interests are at stake (thus, also in the field 
of economic and social cohesion).  Thanks to the Treaty of Lisbon the formal role and power of the 
Committee has increased during the last years. Although its impact on EU policy-making is widely held 
to be rather limited, in the long run it might “lead to the emergence of a common subnational political 
culture” (McCarthy 1997: 440; see also Ricci 2010). Thanks to the Treaty of Lisbon the formal role and 
power of the Committee has also increased during recent years.   
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strengthening of regional actors aims to mobilisation and a more coherent organisation 
with the result that in some states regional structures are introduced where there were none 
before: 
“The European Commission has been actively using cohesion policy to generate 
regional and local demands for greater cohesion and to provide them with an 
organizational underpinning. States without regional structures, such as Greece, 
Ireland and even the Scandinavian applicant countries, have been obliged to establish 
some form of regional administration.” (Hooghe/Keating 1994: 378)  
During the previous years the Commission also conceived the region as a key actor. In its 
Sixth progress report on economic and social cohesion it gives priority to the role of regions for eco-
nomic success (European Commission 2009) and from 2013 “territorial cohesion” will be 
an integral part of cohesion policy (European Commission 2008). All these efforts are likely 
to induce intensified cross-border cooperation or networking and even to contribute to the 
formation of new regional territories; however, they are unlikely to significantly affect the 
influence of national governments. 
This strengthening of regional and local actors agreed on by the member states causes un-
intended consequences of multilevel governance as Marks has shown quite convincingly by 
taking the example of the conflict between the European Commission and the UK over 
the principle of additionality:4 In 1992, British local actors successfully allied with the Com-
mission in order to force the government to change its position on the organisation of the 
funds (Marks 1993). This episode evidences that “member states do not know exactly to 
what they are agreeing to when they sign on” (ibid.: 403). 
 
It became clear that Europe poses the question of redistribution as regional question that 
might potentially trigger a long-term process of double territorialisation: First, because ter-
ritories are central to the regional funds as units of redistribution one can speak of a territo-
rialisation of redistributive policies (cf. Anderson 1995). In sharp contrast to traditional 
redistributive social policies at the national level, it is not individual needs or performance 
at the labour market that define a person’s benefit level; rather socio-economic parameters 
of cities, regions or states condition the payments. This focus on areas instead of house-
holds and individuals reflects the division of labour between national, local, regional and 
the European government and the constraints in regard to social policy-making that are 
nevertheless faced by the EU. The second type of territorialisation stems from the efforts 
to include regions as central actors to raise their awareness, leverage and voice. Both terri-
torial lenses could possibly give birth to an alternative European map. The question is to 
what extent this development brings about new identities, conflicts, interests and solidari-
ties between and within these spatial units independent from former national affiliations.  
                                                 
4 The British government opposed this principle, which aims to ensure that European structural funds do 
not replace national expenditure, and preferred to decide independently on its mode of financing.   
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In conclusion, the development of EU structural policies over time clearly marks a step 
towards supranationalisation, meaning that EU-level social policy is not only subject to 
intergovernmental political bargaining but also to the activities of European actors. That is, 
not only the Commission and the regions as supranational actors successively gained power 
(both through the expansion of competences and the introduction of new instruments), 
also economically, the funds became stronger and more effective. Last but not least, in 
conceptual terms the shift towards economic solidarity, interregional transfers and cross-
national networks is also a sign for a stronger supranational orientation. These processes 
entail crucial path-dependent elements that reinforce the decisions made in the past: The 
expectations of target areas and potential new member states will shape the negotiations on 
future budgets and instruments. Anderson (1995) even states this mechanism will prevent 
traditional redistributive social policy measures targeted at individuals and households from 
emerging.  
3.3 From the Europeanisation of the market to the Europeanisation of 
the social? 
In 1992 the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty promotes “employ-
ment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between 
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high 
employment and the combatting of exclusion.” (TEU 1992) 
Compared to the social goals formulated in the treaty, member states – except the UK – 
show much more commitment to social solidarity within the EU. But the agreement did 
not only extend social policy competences, it also involved procedural reforms as well as 
new concepts: In regard to the decision-making rules at the supranational level it extended 
the qualitative majority voting to the fields “working conditions, information and consulta-
tion of workers, equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportuni-
ties and treatment at work [and] the integration of persons excluded from the labour mar-
ket” (Art. 2.1 and 2.2). The second procedural change widened the actors as it allowed to 
include “management and labour” as new actors in the process of social policy making 
(Art. 3). In conceptual terms the major innovation of the Social Protocol is the integration 
of those without work – a field formerly excluded because it is not directly linked to eco-
nomic integration.  
In 1997 this bundle of regulations agreed on by 11 of the 12 member states was incorpo-
rated into the Treaty of Amsterdam – now applicable to all member states – and allowed 
for more recent social policy developments at the European level. During the last two dec-
ades the EU tried to play a more active role in combating social inequality and unemploy-
ment and in creating new jobs which, again, means a radical departure from its traditional 
areas such as employment protection, gender equality or regulations concerning the free 
movement of workers. In this new era the Commission even came to formulate aims that 
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appear to resemble national social policies targeted at individuals: at least rhetorically the 
documents speak of “employability” (first pillar of the European Employment Strategy 
launched in 1997), “social inclusion” (European Council 2003) and “labour market re-
forms” (European Commission 2012). Obviously, these reforms move beyond the tradi-
tional focus on market making. They hint at a new problem definition of EU-level social 
policy, so my argument here. But how was this ground-breaking change possible?  
The Agreement on Social Policy needs to be viewed in the context of a new political climate, a 
growing self-confidence of supranational actors and the social costs of implementing the 
Euro convergence criteria. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty’s signing, a shift in the 
policy preferences of most member states accommodated the EU-level “pro-harmonisation 
coalition” (Falkner 1998: 65) consisting of the Commission, national and European level 
trade unions and the European Parliament and backed the new regulations.  
With respect to the macroeconomic structure it is no longer the world economy that is 
seen to affect domestic economies; member states start to frame their social and economic 
problems as European problems that can be attributed to the single market and the forma-
tion of the Economic and Monetary Union, so that national governments have started to 
change their mind in favour of joint solutions (see also Rhodes 2005). Sbragia (1994: 70) 
describes this process as “gradual knitting together of the Community and the states that 
compose it”: As members are increasingly affected by the redistributive and regulatory 
elements of EU social policy they also begin to align their preferences and interests accord-
ing to this new constellation. As a result interests are no longer preformed exclusively by 
national settings but are also coined by European institutions.  
At the European level this perceptual and preference change was more than welcome. The 
regulations hint at a new logic behind European social policy. Especially under the Com-
mission presidency of Jacques Delors (1985–1994) social provisions were no longer exclu-
sively linked to the formation of a common market but the need to cushion economic inte-
gration, to promote greater cohesion and create legitimacy and even identity: 
“You cannot fall in love with the single market. […] That is why I am constantly 
stressing the need not only for a frontier-free area but also for the flanking policies 
which will open up new horizons for the men and women who make up this 
Community of ours.” (Delors 1989: 3) 
The vision of “the creation of a European social area […] ensure[s] that economic and 
social progress go hand in hand.” (EC Bulletin 1/1986: 9) This reformulation of the rela-
tionship between the common market and social security and well-being is reminiscent of 
the national constellation. The new conception is accompanied by a diversification of the 
patterns used to justify EU social policy: On the one hand the integration of the European 
social partners can be seen within the wider project of “[s]trengthening democratic legiti-
macy” and the establishment of a “genuine political dimension” of the Union (European 
Commission 1990: 9, 17). On the other hand the widening of competences is linked to a 
new functional dimension assigned to social policy by the Commission. The fact that social 
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policy at the European level takes on a life of its own and gains new relevance as compen-
sating as well as legitimising and integrative part of the Union is not only a clear hallmark 
for European integration, which goes beyond pure market making, but also for the internal 
path-dependent dynamic that accounts for the incremental expansion of social policy 
within the EU.  
So as the problem definition widens the degree of supranationalisation of social policy does 
as well. Given the increasing awareness of social problems as European and not exclusively 
of member states’ problems social policy gradually became a goal in its own right rather 
than resulting only from market compatibility requirements. Here, if not earlier, it becomes 
clear that social policy-making is more than interstate negotiation of national interests. 
Now that the central body pursues its own interests and strives to gain more competencies 
social policy is one of the instruments that flank this process. Just as national governments 
the Commission appreciates the “social dimension” as a legitimising and integrative in-
strument in order to promote greater cohesion, acceptance and even a European identity.5 
In creating “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (TEU 1992: Art. A) the 
newly established entity strives to develop social cohesion, close cooperation and intro-
duces Union citizenship (ibid., Art. B). Thus, the EU has arrived at a highly symbolic level 
typical for state or quasi-state structures.6 This development was flanked and fostered by 
the procedural and technical innovations assigning the Commission and other EU-level 
actors greater competences and more leeway for creating strategies and shaping agendas.     
4. Theoretical Discussion 
The above provided a view of EU social policy development in a long-term perspective. It 
is in line with historical institutionalism’s and Pierson’s famous claim that “actors may be in 
a strong initial position, seek to maximize their interests, and nevertheless carry out institu-
tional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own positions (or those of 
their successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or undesired” (Pierson 1996: 126). 
Before drawing conclusions I would like to point to the main theoretical implications, some 
of which confirm previous works and some of which shed new light on the nature of the 
processes of interest here. 
                                                 
5 More recently this argument has been objected by scholars who show that the Council and the Commis-
sion increasingly came back to legitimise their activities with the formation and creation of new markets 
(e.g. Höpner/Schäfer 2012). Examples for this return of economic patterns of justification can be found in 
the employment package launched in April 2012, where the Commission identifies key labour market 
sectors within the EU, that offer a potential to create jobs (European Commission 2012). 
6 The symbolic dimension of EU social policy involvement becomes even more obvious when consider-
ing the new mode of governance linked to the new fields: Instead of employing binding directives the 
Open Method of Coordination is based on voluntary implementation of the guidelines and recommenda-
tions of the Council and the Commission (Rhodes 2005). At least temporarily this allows a strong com-
mitment at the European level while keeping the sovereignty of the national level. 
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While most scholarship explaining EU social policy or debating future prospects thereof 
highlight the institutional constraints stemming from the multilevel character of the Euro-
pean project, the proposed perspective rather draws on the opportunities that are caused 
by these very limitations. A general structural constraint, for example, is the already existing 
high level of national welfare policies. This fact clearly shapes and guides social policy ac-
tivities at the European level. Combined with the constitutional and political limitations of 
the Union itself the resulting policies (such as the concern the regional disparities) are set-
tled at the boundary between social and economic issues. Especially in the field of social 
exclusion and unemployment the Commission’s actions complement those of the welfare 
states.   
The three periods looked at are examples of how “long-term institutional legacies on policy 
making” (Béland 2009: 702) help to form its future design. Previously enacted measures 
have a major impact on the current development of EU social policies. For example once 
introduced the OMC became crucial in more and more policy fields, which in the long run 
will influence the overall effects and design of European (supranational) social policy. Also 
the EU’s regional politics have yielded a considerable path-dependent dynamic as has been 
shown. Similarly, the inclusion of the Social Agreement into the Treaty of Amsterdam five 
years after its initiation is an example of a reform process that unfolds over time and that 
can be attributed to changing actors’ constellations and preferences, since the change in 
government effected the British opt-in. Generally speaking, these regulations and instru-
ments do not only boost the growing interdependence of the national, European as well as 
regional and local level but they also form the respective context and frame of action, 
which constrains or informs actors’ preferences, political bargains and the social agenda in 
the future. Therefore, in emphasising the institutional dynamics rather than institutional 
inertia, it can be argued that especially at the European level path dependency combined 
with intertemporal effects has brought about institutional reforms, technical and adminis-
trative innovations and thus, in the long run, piecemeal change allowing for political initia-
tives and the expansion of the social dimension.  
Overall, polity building at the European level accompanies the EC’s initial market building 
project. The two can be considered as mutually reinforcing processes, which among others 
strengthened the role of the Commission not only due to procedural reforms, but also 
given its growing independence, aplomb and creative power. The development of the 
structural and regional funds over time has illustrated the European Commission’s detailed 
expert knowledge that combined with its enhanced formal role has resulted in the body’s 
growing independence. This increasing importance casts doubts on the intergovernmental 
argument that only national governments control the emergence of political initiatives. In 
addition, as agenda setter the Commission has the power to introduce new concepts or 
frame political questions, which allows pursuing its own vested interests. This points to the 
importance of ideas in explaining the emergence of social programmes or policy change. 
Especially during the 1980s and 90s, ideas of a social Europe, a social dimension of the EU 
or a European social model have always been driving the political process. Of course, they 
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did not result in a European welfare state but informed and spurred the actors’ way of 
thinking and impacted the notion of what are pressing social and economic issues at the 
European level. 
These policy-making mechanisms, according to the assumption here, yield further conse-
quences. In the widest sense they can be described as interaction effects between the mar-
ket project and an emerging state-building project: The greater the political power, inde-
pendence and competences of the supranational units, the more the EU embarks upon the 
formation of polity structures that have not been envisioned from the outset. This has 
spurred an unprecedented though unintended process of social integration, the instruments 
of which are no longer only designed to flank market building. Thus, over time, the prob-
lem definition of EU social policy changed while its supranational dimension grew 
stronger. As I was able to show this process involves an incremental twofold shift in the 
interpretation of social policy at the European level: from market-promoting to market-
compensating social policies and from cumbrous but necessary to desirable because legiti-
mising and integrative social provisions.   
5. Conclusion  
Those interested in the formation of EU social policy can learn a lot from the multifarious 
works explaining welfare state development and reform and elaborating on the theories 
available. Since they integrate a lot more aspects in their analysis they are in many respects 
better able to explain EU-level developments than the prevailing neofuncionalist or inter-
governmentalist approaches. This is why the paper proposed a historical-sociological per-
spective that draws on the findings and conceptual claims of historical comparativists and 
historical institutionalists. It attempted to get to the bottom of what has been and still is 
guiding the European Union’s social policy. Therefore, it asked for the dynamics of social 
policy-making at the European level for three key periods and tried to identify a specific 
EU social question in order to be able to distinguish between the consequences of European 
integration mostly framed as spillover – namely the erosion of the autonomy of national 
welfare states – and genuine supranational activities. 
It became clear that rather than one grand social question this process bears several possi-
bilities of framing the social problem at the European level. First, although social policy 
had a (marginal) place within the European project from the very beginning, it was only 
existent as a corrective to economic integration. So the first social question grounded in the 
Treaty of Rome can be framed as a market question. This changed slightly when the Com-
mission’s structural policy approach was significantly strengthened during the Delors area 
and, secondly, the European social question became a regional question. So while the mar-
ket-building measures have been triggering a process of deterritorialisation curtailing the 
definitional power of member states in regard to who receives social benefits and the terri-
tory within which social rights are exercised or benefits are granted (Leibfried 2005), the 
  
 
 
 
21  SEU Working Paper No. 3/2012 
EU’s redistributive welfare policies bring about a new territorialisation which is different 
from the one before. The newly evolving territorial regimes are no sovereign units but 
socio-economic entities that do not share the nation state borders. At this step labour mar-
ket-related social imbalances are increasingly taken into consideration but are still mainly 
framed as national problems that only become relevant when harming the single market.  
It is only in the last step that a specific European social question seems to emerge, although 
this remains at a rather symbolic level. Here, the difference between collectively produced 
problems and problems dealt with collectively becomes blurred noticeably. EU-level actors 
derive a necessity to act increasingly from supranational pressures, parameters and mecha-
nisms. Additionally, for the Commission the social question has become also a question of 
legitimacy and a source of social cohesion. However, the observed shift from market-
building to market-compensating social policies does not mean that nowadays the latter 
outrun the former. The process remains linked to and restricted by structural and institu-
tional factors: European social policies reflect the respective opportunities, political atmos-
phere, institutional constraints and economic context just as much as national welfare 
states. Of course, in case of the EU the decision-making process is further complicated by 
the fact the national governments tend to jealously watch their competences (including the 
fact that traditional social policy fields are under the responsibility of nation states) and that 
the Commission is not endowed with legislative competences.  
The paper further illustrated that the incremental and long-winded process of supranation-
alising social policy in the EU is a story of the successive and interrelated expansion of the 
actors involved in the process and the specific social policy competences, as well as of sof-
tening the decision-making rules and of realising conceptual innovations. All four widened 
during the last decades, rendering possible a European social policy that is supranational in 
design and not mainly addressed to national-level problems or tackled by national-level 
solutions. Besides these clearly traceable hard facts the internal dynamic of the EU in gen-
eral and the Commission in particular also contribute to the construction of a wider frame 
of action. EU policies produce the necessity to further regulate the issues once touched. In 
the course of this process, it partly internalised domestic member states’ problems and 
constructed EU-wide indicators that suggest a requirement of EU-wide solutions such as 
the Cohesion Policies that were clearly designed to tackle national economic and social 
imbalances. The European Union provides a new official basis of comparison that relates 
member states to each other which in turn creates the demand for a European solidarity 
and an overall successful economic performance of member states. The financial flows 
between net contributors and net recipients produce interdependencies and new interests. 
This new European scale creates new thresholds and aims. This step is a direct conse-
quence of national welfares states’ failure or incapacity to react to some global develop-
ments: Although national social policy is designed to regulate inequalities at the national 
level, since the 1980s welfare states increasingly refer to transnational problems and the 
impact of economic globalisation on welfare state sovereignty. At least as partly independ-
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ent actors the new supranational actors were able to accommodate this constellation and 
claim more competencies during the 1980s and beginning 90s. 
The recent crisis brings to light these increasing interdependencies. Under the impression 
of the “serious financial crisis” (European Council 2003: 1) and the impending bankruptcy 
of some of its member states the EU witnesses a new episode of political integration in the 
field of economic and social policies. In March 2011 the European Council adopted the 
European Stability Mechanism and the Euro Plus Pact, which focuses on “action where the 
competence lies with the Member States” (ibid.: 14). As the pact aims at a stronger coordi-
nation of economic policies its general goals are to foster competitiveness and employ-
ment, to contribute to the sustainability of public finances and to reinforce financial stabil-
ity. In the long-run this critical juncture might prompt a new step European integration and 
an additional rationale of social policy formulation. 
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